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The rule that suits between partners to obtain an account and
settlement of the affairs of the partnership are subject to the
statute of limitations has recently been applied by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in an interesting case involving
property rights in a seat in the Boston Stock Exchange. Currier
v. Studley, 33 N. E. Rep. 709. The seat in question was pur-
chased with partnership funds and held in the name of one of the
partners, who continued to control it for seventeen years after the
dissolution of the firm, when he sold it at a high premium. On a
suit by the copartner for a division of the proceeds of the sale, it
was held by a four-to-three decision that the copartner could
not recover. In the absence of an express contract in regard to
the matter, or of conduct of the parties which could work an
extension of the time for bringing the suit, the statute began to
run from the dissolution and not from the day of sale. There
could be no trust in favor of the copartner when the other part-
ner held the seat for his own use without objection, and paid sev-
eral fines and assessments in order to retain his membership in
the Exchange. The minority opinion assuming that the seat was
property, and personal, contended that there was evidence on
which a jury could properly have found an express trust, inasmuch
as an express trust in personal property may be created and shown
by parol. If not an express trust, there was a resultant or con-
structive trust which would prevent adverse possession until the
seat was sold, which was less than six years prior to the institution
of the suit. Even if there were no trust, it was claimed that the
statute of limitations as to personal actions affected only the rem-
edy and did not extinguish the right.
Whatever doubts may have been raised by the decision of the
Court of Appeals of New York in upholding the Apportionment
Act of 1892, as to the disposition on the part of that court to
interfere with the "gerrymander," have been silenced by the
decision of Peoble ex rel. Baird et al. v. Board of Supervisors, 33 N.
E. Rep. 827. Among the duties of the Board of Supervisors of
each county is that of dividing the county into assembly districts
in conformity with the plan outlined in the Act of 1892. The
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Kings County Board attempted to divide that county into
eighteen districts, and succeeded in varying the size of the dis-
tricts so that the Ninth contained about thirty thousand inhabi-
tants, and the Fifth over one hundred thousand. The court held
that this division was in violation of the constitutional require-
ment as to equality of representation, and that not only did the
constitution require such equality, but the policy of the State
since the beginning of its existence had been in the line of direct
representation of inhabitants as distinguished from representation
through corporations of a quasi-political character, and while per-
fect equality was impossible, owing to certain requirements as to
convenience and contiguity of territory and the indivisibility of
towns in making the division, yet the Supervisors of Kings
County had plainly made an unequal division. Although the Act
of 1892 did not in express terms call for a division as nearly
"as may be according to population," nevertheless the constitu-
tional duty resting upon the Board was as plain as that. which
rests upon a legislature when making an apportionment. What-
ever discretion may have been vested in the Supervisors was
held to be subject to review by the courts, but the opinion goes
on to say : "We do not intend by this decision to hold that every
trifling deviation from equality of population would justify or
warrant an application to a court for redress. It must be a grave,
palpable, and unreasonable deviation from the standard, so that,
when the facts are presented, argument would not be necessary
to convince a fair man that very great and wholly unnecessary
inequality has been intentionally provided for." The action of
the Supervisors, being unconstitutional, was a nullity, and man-
damus was held to be the proper means to compel them to make
a valid division of the County of Kings into assembly districts.
It is most encouraging to note the growing ten dency of courts
of last resort to interfere with the "gerrymander," and thus to
secure to citizens their undoubted political right-that of equality
of representation.
The subject of constitutional revision is one of so much inter-
est and importance in Connecticut at the present time that we
take occasion to quote from the able argument of Hon. Henry C.
Robinson before the Judiciary Committee at Hartford, upon a bill
providing for a constitutional convention : "Let me submit to
the committee that a constitutional convrention is not the best
body of men to revise a constitution. A smaller body of men,
representative of wisdom and study in constitutional law, of the
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great commercial, educational, and agricultural interests of ourState, in number not exceeding twenty-five or thirty, made up in
nearly equal proportion from both parties and selected with care,
either by the General Assembly, or by the executive or the ChiefJustice, or, as has been suggested, by four of our distinguished
ex-Governors, would give the people better results than would be
obtained from a convention formed upon the lines of this bill.
* * * To be a member of such a Commission should be a highhonor, and its members- should serve without compensation. Thelegislature should provide a room for their public meetings, and
clerks and stenographers, and should pay the personal expenses
of its members." Revision of organic law otherwise than in
accordance with the mode prescribed by that law, is no doubt, as
Mr. Robinson shows, revolutionary in its character, and justifia-ble only as an extreme measure, but we are inclined to believe
that a large portion of the people of this State are thoroughly
convinced that a change in the constitution is so necessary as tojustify almost any peaceful means that may be employed to bring
about that result. The true democratic idea is that representa-
tion is to be based upon the individual and not the town as the
unit. However, such a commission as is suggested, would draft afar better constitution, and one more adapted to the real needs of
the people, than would be obtained as the result of the labors of a
constitutional convention.
The letter carriers' eight-hour law, enacted May 24, 1888 (25St. 157), provides that eight hours shall constitute a day's workfor letter carriers, and that if any letter carrier is employed agreater number of hours per day he shall be paid extra in propor-
tion to the salary fixed by law. Under this statute a number of
cases have come before the Court of Claims (See 27 Ct. Cl. 244),
and have been decided uniformly in favor of the carriers. Two
of these cases (U. S. v. Post, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 67 and U. S. v.Gates, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570), were appealed to the SupremeCourt, and have been decided very recently. In U. S. v. Post,
the contention of the government is that this law applies only to
the particular work of a letter carrier, the collection and distribu-
tion of mail, and the carrier must show that he performed eighthours service of this kind, and that the extra hours were devoted
to work of a similar nature. The Court of Claims found in this
case that a considerable part of the carrier's work was in the post
office and of a clerical character. The court held that to recoverfor extra hours it was only necessary that he be a letter carrier
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and be lawfully employed,, under the direction of the postmaster,
in work that is not inconsistent with his general business as a
letter carrier. In U. S. v. Gates, sibra, an additional question is
raised. On Sundays and holidays the number of hours' service
falls short of eight. It is contended by the department that as
many hours should be deducted from the total number of extra
hours as may be necessary to make up the deficit on Sundays and
holidays. But the court held that the carrier is -entitled to his
full salary whether he is furnished work eight hours a day or less,
and for any excess above eight hours on any day, he is entitled to
extra pay. To sustain the interpretation given the act by the
department would necessitate reading in it, by construction, the
words, "on an average, eight hours per day," which is manifestly
contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the statute.
There is some conflict of opinion in different parts of the
-Union as to whether the public can be ousted by adverse posses-
sion of its right to a highway once dedicated. The Supreme
Court of Rhode Island in the recent case of Almy v. Church, 26
Atl. Rep. 58, applies the rule, "nullum temjus occurrit regi," on the
ground of public policy, the lack of interest felt by individuals in
public rights, and since an obstruction is a nuisance and no
nuisance can ripen into a right. Other States taking the same
view are, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Louisiana,
Indiana, Iowa, California, Mississippi and Tennessee. The
Rhode Island decision, however, qualifies the doctrine to this
extent, that when a highway has been obstructed, and another
way equally convenient has been in use by general and long-
continued acquiescence, the latter will be considered as substi-
tuted for the original highway.
